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Exceeding the Scope of the Patent: Solving
the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem
Through Antitrust Enforcement and
Regulatory Reform
by WILLIAM J. NEWSOM*
Spawned and encouraged by the Hatch-Waxman Act, reverse
payment settlements in pharmaceutical patent litigation, also known as
"pay for delay" settlements, are almost universally anticompetitive.
Nonetheless, because of the current regulatory framework and a failure
of courts to address the definition of patent scope, many of these
agreements are upheld as legal, falling under a patent "exception" to
antitrust liability. However, the patent "exception," while certainly a
valid concern, does not apply to pay for delay settlements because
paying to protect one's patent is inherently beyond the scope of that
patent. This article will address the problem, and propose a new and
comprehensive solution.
I. Introduction
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, now known primarily as the Hatch-Waxman Act,' was
intended to benefit consumers by allowing generic drug makers
("DMs") to challenge the patents of pioneer DMs in a simple and
* J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.S., Mechanical
Engineering, University of California at Los Angeles. The author would like to thank
Professor Jeffrey Lefstin, Professor Robin Feldman, Krunal Patel, Matthew Avery and the
editors of the Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal for their input, guidance, and
hard work.
1 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000), 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2000), and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000)).
[201]
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cost effective manner.2 Further, it enabled generic DMs to piggyback
on the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")-mandated drug
testing done by the pioneer.' The theory was that, if competition
could be introduced into the prescription drug market by facilitating
generic entry, drug prices would drop and consumers would better be
able to afford quality healthcare. However, while the Act was noble
in its purpose, and it succeeded in lowering drug prices in some cases,
the Act has also created a perverse regulatory system, the
manipulation of which can extend the patent monopoly owned by
pioneer DMs.4 This unintended consequence is made worse by the
fact that the regulatory scheme has cast a cloud of uncertainty over
the classical intersection of antitrust and patent law, further blurring
the lines between the two. By altering the normal incentive-based
landscape of patent litigation, Hatch-Waxman has spawned
agreements that would otherwise be per se antitrust violations to go
forward unscathed, as a majority of courts have found them to be
protected by patent law and the general policy of encouraging
settlement of patent litigation, under almost any circumstance. The
agreements spawned by this regulatory environment, generally
referred to as reverse payment settlement agreements, are
encouraged by the Hatch-Waxman Act's regulatory regime.' These
agreements preserve the patentee's monopoly power over a
prescription drug market by making "exit payments" to generic DMs
who have applied for FDA approval. That is, the pioneer suing the
generic DM settles the case by paying the generic to cease litigation
and agree not to compete in the market for the pioneer's drug. Such
payments are unquestionably anticompetitive, but have repeatedly
been upheld as legal.' The problem, which has been decried by
members of Congress,9 courts,1" and many scholars,11 has led to the
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000)
("It shall be an act of infringement to submit ... an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent .. ").
3. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2000).
4. See, e.g. cases discussed infra Section I.B.
5. Id.
6. These type of payments are also referred to as "exit" and "exclusion" payments.
7. For an explanation of the dynamics of this type of agreement, see hypothetical
infra at Section III.A.2.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. 57,566 (daily ed. July 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (stating that he "find[s] these types of reverse payment collusive arrangements
appalling.").
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proposition of a number of solutions and a split among circuits on the
correct outcome of such cases.' Yet, thus far, the solutions have
failed to create a consensus among the circuit courts, and none of the
proposed legislation has passed.'3
This Note will argue that a true solution to the problem posed by
reverse payment settlements must involve a combination of judicial,
administrative, and congressional action. Some positive steps have
already been taken, such as the 2003 amendments embodied in the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
(hereinafter, "MMA"),14 which was intended to curtail some of the
abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Unfortunately, these amendments
have largely failed, 5 though they are a step in the right direction. For
example, the fact that the Federal Trade Commision ("FTC") now
reviews any reverse payment settlements, as they must be submitted
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See, e.g., Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection,
Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that reverse payment settlements
should be banned); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, The Interface
Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law: Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L.REV. 1719, 1727 (2003) (suggesting a
presumption of illegality for reverse payment settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context,
and limiting reverse payments in any case to litigation costs); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining
the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse
Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87 MINN. L.REV. 1789
(2003) (suggesting a slightly more lenient standard than the Hovenkamp article); C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1553, 1596 (also suggesting a rebuttable presumption of
illegality).
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. Compare In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899, 901 (6th Cir.
2003) (finding a per se antitrust violation), with In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
429 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the agreement to be protected from antitrust
liability by patent law). See also Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316,
110th Cong. § 3(2) (2007) (which would have barred settlement agreements where the
"ANDA filer receives anything of value" and "agrees not to research, develop,
manufacture, market, or sell the ANDA product for any period of time."); Press Release,
Sen. Grassley, Kohl, Leahy and Schumer Introduce Bill to Stop 'Payoffs' That Delay
Generic Drugs (June 27, 2006), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Press Releases.Detail&PressReleaseid=b292869c-4975 -41 a9-a6ad.
14. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (effective Dec. 8, 2003).
15. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
171 (2008).
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to the FTC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"),"6 ensures that
such settlements will not go unnoticed, and will often be challenged if
there is a legitimate antitrust concern.' However, to be truly
effective, the amendments require both a change in the predominant
case law, as the current state of such decisions weigh in favor of
allowing the reverse payment settlements, and a further, perhaps
harsher amendment of the regulatory regime. Combined with FTC
and private antitrust enforcement, the age of the reverse payment
settlement can give way to a more pro-competitive, consumer-friendly
era of generic drugs, one in which settlements promote earlier entry
by generic DMs, thus passing the savings to consumers, rather than
hording the monopoly profits and sharing them amongst horizontal
competitors."
This Note first analyses the current regulatory regime, and
provides an extensive review of the most important case law in the
area.' 9 Next, the Note discusses the scope of the problem and its
roots, and the confusing question of the true scope of the patent.
Finally, the Note poses a multi-faceted solution, analyzing and
critiquing some previous proposals before settling on this author's
recommendation. 21
Finally, it should be noted that addressing the public interest in
invalidating "bad" or weak patents, and protecting the interests of the
consumer in antitrust and patent litigation are beyond the scope of
this article.
II. Analysis of the Current Regime
In reviewing the current state of the law, it is important to
analyze both the relevant statutes and the most relevant case law.
This section will first present a short explanation of the history and
context of the regulatory regime created by the Hatch-Waxman Act
and its amendments. Next the section will analyze the relevant case
16. Medicare Modernization Act, supra note 14, § 1112.
17. In fact, the FTC challenged an agreement earlier this year in the D.C. District
Court, filing suit against Cephalon for entering reverse payment settlements with four
ANDA applicants. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 9, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No.
1:08-cv-00244 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008).
18. See, e.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1762 (discussing the pro-competitive
alternative of delayed entry for generics).
19. See infra Section II
20. See infra Section III
21. See infra Section IV
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law discussing reverse-payment settlements at the circuit court level
(with one notable exception in the Southern District of Florida). The
case law interprets the conflicting purposes and effects of the Hatch-
Waxman Act as it interacts with antitrust and patent law. The cases
are resolved differently by the separate circuit courts, thus creating a
circuit split, and exemplifying the two leading schools of thought on
how to resolve these conflicts. Finally, the section addresses the
current majority and minority rules drawn from the different Circuit
Court decisions and offers some brief criticism.
A. Hatch-Waxman - A Brief Overview
To bring a new pharmaceutical product, referred to as a pioneer
drug, to market, a pharmaceutical company must file a New Drug
Application ("NDA") with the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), and obtain approval.2' This process is exhaustive and
expensive, involving extensive testing, including human clinical
trials.2 Once the FDA has approved an NDA, the pioneer DM can
make and sell its drug.24
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, which is now generally known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act." The purpose of the Act was two-fold: first "to
induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments
necessary to research and develop new drug products," and second, to
enable "competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to
market."6 To this end, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic DMs
to avoid the expensive NDA approval process by filing an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). The ANDA filing
allows the generic DM to obtain FDA approval upon a showing of
bioequivalence. A "bioequivalent" of a drug that has received NDA
approval, essentially a copy or a different form of the same drug, is
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application.
is effective with respect to such drug.").
23. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2005).
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
25. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000), 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2000), and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000)).
26. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also H.R. REP. No.
98-857, at 14-15 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2000).
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known as a "generic., 21 The ANDA process also requires
certification that the generic drug will not infringe any patent listed in
conjunction with an NDA because it falls within one of four
categories: (I) there is no patent, or none on file with the FDA; (II)
the patent(s) in question has expired; (III) the generic drug will not
be marketed until the patent in question expires; or (IV) the patent in
21question is invalid or not infringed by the generic.
When a generic DM files an ANDA within the fourth category,
called a paragraph IV certification (a "Paragraph IV ANDA"), the
Hatch-Waxman Act defines that certification itself as an act of patent
infringement." A pioneer DM with an approved NDA then has
forty-five days to sue the ANDA applicant for infringement.
Otherwise the ANDA can be approved right away. 31 However, if the
pioneer sues the generic applicant within forty-five days, it triggers a
thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the ANDA.2 The FDA can
"tentatively approve" the ANDA , but actual approval can only
occur on the expiration of the stay or a district court finding of
invalidity or non-infringement of the patent.
In order to incentivize generic challenges to weak patents, the
first generic DM to file a Paragraph IV ANDA, and thus to risk
expensive patent litigation with the pioneer DM, is rewarded with 180
days of market exclusivity upon generic entry of the market.35 The
FDA enforces this exclusivity by refusing to approve a subsequent
ANDA for the same drug until the expiration of the 180-day
exclusivity period.36 Prior to 1998, the 180-day exclusivity was subject
to a "successful defense" of ensuing patent litigation, but the rule now
28. In the words of the FDA, "[a] generic drug is identical, or bioequivalent to a
brand name drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality,
performance characteristics and intended use." FDA, Office of Generic Drugs,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Bioequivalence requires that the
"rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference from the
rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug." 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(8)(B)(i) (2000).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2000).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000) ("It shall be an act of infringement to submit ...
an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a
patent ...").
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
32. Id.
33. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd).
34. Id. at §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(IV).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
36. Id.
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applies even without litigation. The exclusivity period creates a
duopoly, which the generic can use to garner a significant market
share, while maintaining prices above the competitive level.3
These provisions have been effective in promoting generic
challenges to pioneer drugs, 39 but have also led to abuses of the
system, by which pioneers are able to effectively delay generic entry
even in the face of legitimate challenges. 4' For example, the first
ANDA filer and the pioneer patentee can settle their lawsuit with a
provision that the generic DM will not enter the market until a later
date, often in exchange for a "reverse" payment from the patentee to
the generic challenger. 41 Thus, because the first filer does not market
his product, the 180-day exclusivity period does not start, and further
ANDAs cannot be approved. And while an agreement to pay a
competitor not to enter the market is generally considered a per se
violation of the Sherman Act,42 a majority of circuit courts have ruled
that these agreements are protected as falling within the scope of the
legal monopoly granted by a patent.43
In response to criticism from members of Congress,44 the FTC,45
and even President Bush,46 Congress enacted the MMA.47 The MMA
37. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(overturning the FDA's "successful defense" requirement for the 180-day marketing
exclusivity).
38. See Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic to Ding Generics, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 2004, at BI (Describing Barr's successful challenge of Prozac, which led to Barr
earning "revenue of about $368 million from the new drug, or 31-percent of its total"
during the first year it entered the market).
39. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 10 (July 2002) (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs
between 1984 and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the "Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 117
(2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, FTC) (noting challenges involving more
than eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003).
40. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY, at i (July 2002).
41. Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug
Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51,74 (2003).
42. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. See, e.g., supra note 9.
45. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
46. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Prescription Drugs
(Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/ 10/print/20021021-
2.html (proposing new FDA regulations to expedite generic drug approvals).
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made significant changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act, including
limiting use of the thirty-month stay to one per ANDA filer 4
providing for forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity period under
certain conditions, 49 and requiring that reverse payment settlements
and other potentially collusive types of agreements be filed with the
FTC and the DOJ.' However, these provisions have been largely
ineffective,1 though they are certainly a step in the right direction.
B. Decisions, Decisions, Decisions
To understand the extent of the problem, a detailed
understanding of the most relevant case law is needed. The following
case summaries are illustrative of the prevalence of reverse payment
settlements and the regulatory problems that encourage them.
Moreover, attention must be paid to the analyses undertaken by
courts, as they reveal the best analysis, albeit through somewhat of a
trial and error process.
Thus far, the Second, Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeal have all ruled on antitrust challenges to reverse payment
settlements of pharmaceutical patent infringement suits. The Sixth
Circuit, in one of the earlier decisions, found such agreements to be a
per se violation of the Sherman Act as not just an agreement in
restraint of trade, but a naked horizontal restraint, which is always
held to be per se illegal. Further, the Sixth Circuit rejected the notion
that a naked horizontal restraint could be immunized from the
antitrust laws by the mere existence of a patent. Nonetheless, the
Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits have all rejected the per se
treatment applied by the Sixth Circuit, and have applied some form of
what now appears to be the accepted test: whether the agreement in
question exceeds the scope of the patent. If the scope of the
agreement and the scope of the patent are concentric, these courts
have held, there is no antitrust violation. In some cases, these courts
distinguished the Sixth Circuit decision by pointing out that the
47. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (effective Dec. 8, 2003).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000) (essentially codifying SmithKline Beecham Corp.
v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2000).
50. Medicare Modernization Act, supra note 14, § 1112.
51. See generally Avery, supra note 15. See also Hemphill, supra note 11, at 1571
(noting that in 2005 and 2006 a number of reverse payment settlements were filed with the
FTC).
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agreement in that case would apply to non-patented alternative
generic drugs as well as those covered by the patent, and thus the
agreements exceed the scope of the patent. Yet, notwithstanding
these appellate decisions, at least one district court on remand
nonetheless found a per se violation of the antitrust laws after
applying the test dictated by the Eleventh Circuit.
Thus there remains a split in the Circuits, with a concurrence
amongst a majority of circuits that have weighed in on these reverse
payment settlements. And even amongst those in the majority, the
Eleventh Circuit was not willing to go so far as to overturn the district
court below when it found a per se antitrust violation in spite of the
Eleventh Circuit's contrary prior ruling which established the "scope
of the patent" test. Still, a true understanding of the case law requires
an analysis of the five major decisions, as provided below, in
chronological order.
1. In re Cardizem (Sixth Circuit 2003)
In one of the first major appellate decisions on the antitrust
liability of reverse payment settlements of Hatch-Waxman
pharmaceutical patent litigation, In re Cardizem,s2 the Sixth Circuit
found a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
In this case, Hoechst Marion Roussel ("HMR") made a heart
drug, Cardizem! A generic competitor of HMR's, Andrx, filed a
paragraph IV ANDA seeking to market a generic version of
Cardizem, claiming non-infringement of the listed patents. 4 Within
the forty-five-day period HMR sued Andrx for infringement,
enacting the thirty-month stay under Hatch-Waxman.' HMR's suit
sought neither damages nor a preliminary injunction, and Andrx
brought antitrust and misuse counterclaims. 5'
After the generic competitor Andrx won tentative FDA approval
for its drug, HMR and Andrx signed an agreement under which
Andrx would refrain from entering the generic market, even after
receiving FDA approval, but would hold on to its 180-day exclusivity
period." In return, HMR would make quarterly payments to Andrx
52. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 896, 899, 901.
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of $10 million.5' Further, HMR agreed to pay Andrx $100 million per
year, less interim payments, if the patent was judged not infringed on
a final unappealable ruling, or if HMR dropped the infringement
suit.59 The agreement was terminated when Andrx formulated and
got approval for a new version of the drug that didn't infringe, at
which point HMR paid Andrx an additional $50.7 million, bringing
total payments to $89.83 million.6 Antitrust plaintiffs then sued
HMR and Andrx for violations of §1 of the Sherman Act, alleging
that the agreement prevented generic competition, thereby causing
customers to pay higher prices for Cardizem I The district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment that the
agreement was per se unlawful.62 Notably, the district court found the
agreements to be a naked horizontal restraint of trade.63
Defendants appealed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that
"the agreement cannot be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to
enforce patent rights or an interim settlement of the patent
litigation. 6 4 The court differentiated the payment here as straying
from the patent right, writing that "it is one thing to take advantage of
a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting
competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40 million per
year to stay out of the market."'6  The antitrust injury arose from the
fact that the agreement also delayed the entry of other generic
competitors by use of the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.66
Of great importance to later decisions, especially in
distinguishing this case, was the fact that the agreement here
precluded Andrx from marketing other generic or bioequivalent
versions of Cardizem not at issue in the pending litigation. 7 Yet,
58. Id.
59. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 903.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 903-904.
62. Id. at 905. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F.Supp.2d 618, 682 (E.D.
Mich. 2000).
63. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 905. See In re Cardizern CD Antitrust Litig., 105
F.Supp.2d 618, 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
64. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 907.
67. See id. at 908 n.13 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261
F.Supp.2d 188,242 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2003)).
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while later courts would rely on that fact to distinguish In re Cardizem
from subsequent cases, the Cardizem court did not rely on that aspect
of the agreement, but rather dismissed the idea that a naked
horizontal restraint could be immunized from antitrust scrutiny
simply because it arose in the context of a settlement of patent
litigation."s
2. Valley Drug (Eleventh Circuit 2003)
The Valley Drug case was a reversal of the trend towards per se
illegality established by In re Cardizem. After the district court in
Valley Drug found the agreements there to be per se illegal, the 11th
Circuit reversed.' 9 The case arose from settlements between Abbott
Labs ("Abbott"), Geneva Pharmaceuticals ("Geneva"), and Zenith
Goldline Pharmaceuticals ("Zenith") regarding a hypertension drug.
Abbott manufactured and sold Hytrin, a hypertension drug with
the active ingredient terazosin hydrochloride ("terazosin"). 7° Abbott
had a number of patents filed with the FDA that covered various
crystalline forms of terazosin and methods for its use. 1 Geneva and
Zenith both filed multiple paragraph IV ANDAs to sell generic
versions of Hytrin in different forms." Abbott sued both for
infringement." Abbott then entered into agreements with both
Zenith and Geneva, agreeing to pay them money to stay out of the
market and to retain their rights to any 180-day marketing exclusivity
period they may have hadi4 The Geneva agreement paid Geneva
$4.5 million a month, with the agreement to expire upon expiration of
the patents, entry by another generic, or an unappealable Geneva win
invalidating the patent." The Zenith agreement paid Zenith $6
million per quarter and was to expire upon expiration of the patent or
the generic entry by another. Both agreements entailed provisions
that the generics would oppose any subsequent ANDAs filed by
others. The agreements ended when the FTC investigated them,
68. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
69. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 1298.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1299-1300
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1300-1301.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1300.
77. Id.
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resulting in a consent settlement agreement between the parties and
the FTC, dissolving the agreements and resulting in a fine for the
parties."
Plaintiffs filed suit and moved for partial summary judgment that
the agreements were per se illegal." The district court granted the
motion."' The order issued by the district court characterized the
agreements as geographic market allocations between horizontal
competitors."' Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, claiming that
the rule of reason is required and that the agreements were patent
litigation settlements that must be analyzed under the rule of reason,
unless they were shams. 2
Finding that horizontal market allocations are clearly
anticompetitive, the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless distinguished this
case "because one of the parties owned a patent."" Next, the court
found that the exclusionary effects of the settlement agreements may
be within the potential exclusionary power of the patents in question,
and thus, per se analysis is inappropriate. The court then found that
a subsequent finding of invalidity of a patent has no bearing on the
antitrust analysis, because the reasonableness of an agreement in the
antitrust context is evaluated at the time it is entered into. Next the
court disagreed with plaintiffs' allegation that "reverse," "exit," or
"exclusion" payments were not within the patent scope, emphasizing
the importance of allowing settlements and the fact that the Hatch-
86Waxman statutes encourage such settlements. Nonetheless, the
court acknowledged that reverse payments could be "suspicious," but
that their presence alone does not demonstrate anticompetitive
tendencies." Finally, the court concluded by holding that any
78. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1301. See Matter of Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000
WL 681848 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000).
79. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1301.
80. Id.
81. Id. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F.Supp.2d 1340
(S.D.Fla. 2000).
82. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1303.
83. Id. at 1304.
84. Id. at 1305-1306 (noting that "the exclusion of infringing competition is the
essence of the patent grant.").
85. Id. at 1306-1307 (citing Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th
Cir. 1985)).
86. Id. at 1309-1311.
87. Id.
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provisions of the agreements that have effects beyond the
exclusionary effects of the patent may be subject to traditional
antitrust analysis.'
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Sixth Circuit's per se
analysis. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit established that the
appropriate analysis is to compare the provisions of the agreement to
the exclusionary effects of the patent. Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit left the door open to a finding of antitrust liability on remand,
albeit under a more thorough and stringent analysis.
3. In re Terazosin (Valley Drug on Remand, S.D. Fla. 2005)
On remand, the district court nonetheless found that the
agreements were per se unlawful violations of §1 of the Sherman
Act. 9 Applying the Eleventh Circuit's holding, and using Herbert
Hovenkamp's suggested approach,9" the court adopted a three-part
test to determine whether the agreements violated the antitrust laws. 9'
Under the three-part test, the court first analyzed the exclusionary
power of the patent, including the likely outcome of a preliminary
injunction motion and/or a final adjudication in the underlying patent
litigation.92 Next, the court analyzed whether, given the scope of the
patent, the agreements were a reasonable implementation of the
exclusionary power of the patent.93 Finally, the court looked to
whether any effects of the agreement that exceeded the power of the
patent were subject to traditional antitrust analysis.94 In adopting this
framework, the court justified the review of the underlying patent
litigation by reviewing the actual exclusionary right of the patent. 9'
Most notably, the court quoted an article by Carl Shapiro, "theorizing
88. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312.
89. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F.Supp.2d 1279 (S.D.Fla. 2005)
90. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1727 (suggesting that the analysis "ensure
(1) that the parties did have a bona fide dispute, (2) that the settlement is a reasonable
accommodation, and (3) that the settlement is not more anticompetitive than a likely
outcome of litigation.").
91. In re Terazosin, 352 F.Supp.2d at 1295.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1295-96.
94. Id. at 1296.
95. Id.
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that a patent does not give the patentee the right to exclude, but the
right to try to exclude by asserting its patent in court." 9'
Applying its new framework, the district court found that the
evidence in the underlying patent litigation allowed only one
conclusion-that a preliminary injunction motion would be denied and
the patent would be held inval . Having found that the only likely
outcome of the litigation would be the invalidity of the patent at
issue, the court then found that the market allocation agreements
exceeded the scope of the patent and, as a naked horizontal restraint
on competition, was per se illegal.9 Accordingly, the court granted
the plaintiffs' renewed motions for summary judgment.99
Here, on remand from Valley Drug, the district court was bold
enough to tackle the question of whether the scope of the settlement
agreement exceeded the exclusionary power of the patent. Although
this approach was criticized in later circuit court opinions-finding
evaluation of the underlying patent right impractical-this belabored
opinion performed a full analysis. Thus, even in the face of a
rebuttable presumption of validity, analysis of the true scope of the
patent, including its strength and the likelihood that it will be upheld
at trial, is possible. An although this may have been an easy analysis
in light of the subsequent invalidity finding, it is nonetheless an
important example that such an analysis is not beyond the ability of
courts to undertake.
4. Schering-Plough (Eleventh Circuit 2005)
Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit revisited its holding in the
Valley Drug case in yet another reverse payment settlement case,
Schering-Plough. In this case, Schering had a patent on an extended-
release coating for a potassium supplement, which it marketed as K-
Dur 20.... Two competitors filed ANDAs to market generic versions
96. Id. (quoting Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 391, 395 (2003)). The court also quoted Herbert Hovenkamp's article, stating that
"[t]he legitimate exclusion value of a pharmaceutical patent [like the '207 patent] is the
power it actually confers over competition, which is in turn a function of the scope of the
patent and its chance of being held valid." In re Terazosin, 352 F.Supp.2d at 1296 (citing
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1761).
97. In re Terazosin, 352 F.Supp.2d at 1300-1307. The court also noted that the high
reversal rates in patent cases did not protect the agreements. Id. at 1310.
98. Id. at 1307-1319.
99. Id. at 1319-1320.
100. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
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of K-Dur 20, and Schering sued each of them for infringement. 101
Both lawsuits settled during litigation, with agreements that set a time
for generic entry, and gave payments from the patentee, Schering, to
the proposed generics, Upsher and ESI. The Upsher agreement,
signed the day before trial, provided that Upsher would stay off the
market for K-Dur until September 1, 2001, five years prior to the
expiration of the K-Dur patent.102  In addition, because Upsher
demanded additional payment to "stay off the market," Schering
agreed to license five patents from Upsher, including one covering
Niacor, a niacin supplement Schering had already sought to license
from another company. 13 After Schering estimated the net present
value of Niacor to be around $250 million, it licensed the five Upsher
patents in exchange for: "(1) $60 million in initial royalty fees; (2) $10
million in milestone royalty payments; and (3) 10% or 15% royalties
on sales.' 4 The ESI settlement agreement allowed ESI to enter the
market on January 1, 2004, but upon ESI's demand also provided that
Schering would pay ESI $5 million for legal fees and another $10
million, contingent upon ESI obtaining FDA approval for its
generic.
The FTC filed an administrative complaint against the three
parties in 2001, charging them with violations of section 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and section 5 of the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA")."6 An ALJ heard the case and dismissed the complaint,
finding the agreements not illegal per se.'(7 The ALJ found that the
FTC failed to prove its case regarding monopolization, that their
argument required invalidity or non-infringement of the patent to be
proven, and that there was no evidence that the payments resulted in
later entry dates and less competition.'( The FTC then appealed to
the full commission, which reversed the ALJ."9 The FTC found that
"the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement to defer the
entry dates, and that such delay would injure competition and
101. Id. at 1058-59, 1060.
102. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1059.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1060.
105. Id. at 1060-61. Notably, Schering at the time did not expect ESI to obtain FDA
approval by the required date. Id.
106. Id. at 1061.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1061-1062.
109. Id. at 1062. See No. FTC 9297, 2003 WL 22989651.
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consumers."' ' ( In addition, the FTC found the payments not to be
legitimate consideration for the licenses obtained, and created a rule
banning settlements involving a reverse payment in excess of $2
million for litigation costs."' Schering appealed the decision to the
Eleventh Circuit.
Reviewing for substantial evidence, the Eleventh Circuit relied
on its decision in Valley Drug, finding neither the rule of reason nor
the per se analysis to be appropriate in the instant case."' Rather,
they applied Valley Drug, finding the proper analysis to be "an
examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and
(3) the resulting anticompetitive effects. 11 3 After cautioning against
restraints on settlements, the court found both agreements to be
within the scope of the patent. ' 4 Finally, addressing anticompetitive
effects, the court found the agreements to be a legitimate compromise
and an expected byproduct of the Hatch-Waxman redistribution of
risk, and noted that the ban proposed by the FTC would be unwise."'
5. Tamoxifen (Second Circuit 2005)
The Tamoxifen decision, despite ruling with the majority of
courts that the key question was whether the scope of the patent
exceeded the scope of the agreement, accentuated a number of the
problems with the current regulatory regime, and found reverse
payment settlement agreements to be "suspicious."1 6 And while the
decision was well reasoned at points and levied an excellent criticism
of reverse payment settlements in general (albeit unintentionally), the
majority failed to address the true scope of the patent, assuming
generally that settlement agreements are within that scope so long as
they are not based on "sham" litigation. Notably, the court even
stated that paying to "protect" one's patent from litigation is legal.1
110. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1062.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1065.
113. Id. at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).
114. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1068-72. Notably the court found that the
Schering-Upsher agreement covered the "identical reach of the '743 patent." Id. at 1073.
115. Id. at 1072-1076.
116. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2005).
117. Id. at 389 ("[w]e do not think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to
protect its patent monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation."); Id. at
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Tamoxifen was the most widely prescribed drug for the
treatment of breast cancer."' After Imperial Chemical Companies
(the predecessor to AstraZeneca, hereinafter collectively "Zeneca")
obtained the patent for tamoxifen in 1985, along with FDA approval,
Barr Laboratories ("Barr") filed an ANDA requesting approval to
market a generic version of tamoxifen n9  Barr amended its
application in 1987 to include a paragraph IV certification.1 2  Zeneca
then brought an infringement suit within forty-five days, against Barr
and its supplier.'2' The district court ruled in favor of Barr, finding the
tamoxifen patent invalid because Zeneca deliberately withheld
crucial information from the Patent and Trademarks Office
("PTO'). 122
Zeneca appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit, but while
the appeal was pending the parties entered into a confidential
settlement agreement (the "Tamoxifen Agreement").' 23  In the
Tamoxifen Agreement, Zeneca agreed to give Barr $21 million and
grant them a non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca manufactured
tamoxifen under Barr's label, and paid Barr's supplier $9.5 million,
plus $35.9 million over the next ten years.124 In exchange, Barr
amended its ANDA to a paragraph III certification, agreeing not to
market its own generic version of Tamoxifen until the Zeneca patent
expired. 2  Additionally, the Tamoxifen Agreement allowed Barr to
revert to a paragraph IV certification upon a final and unappealable
ruling that the tamoxifen patent was invalid or unenforceable.126 The
Tamoxifen Agreement was contingent on the Federal Circuit granting
vacatur of the district court judgment, which it did upon a joint
392 n.22 ("we think that Zeneca was then entitled to protect its tamoxifen patent monopoly
through settlement.") (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 377.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc., 126 F.R.D. 467, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
122. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 377 (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 795 F.Supp. 619, 626-627 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
123. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 377.
124. 1d.
125. 1d.
126. Id. at 378.
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motion by Barr and Zeneca. 127 After entering the agreement and
obtaining vacatur, Barr began selling tamoxifen under its label, selling




Subsequently, three more paragraph IV ANDAs were filed by
would-be generic DMs, and Zeneca succeeded in three corresponding
infringement suits.1 29 Meanwhile, Barr asserted its right to a 180-day
marketing exclusivity period in order to prevent Mylan and
Pharmachemie (two of the three companies that subsequently filed
ANDAs) from marketing generic versions of Tamoxifen until after
Barr had triggered and exhausted the exclusivity period.1) The FDA
affirmed Barr's right to its exclusivity period, and after Mylan and
Pharmachemie challenged the FDA decision successfully in district
court, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FDA decision,
vacating the district court decision as moot, because Mylan and
Pharmachemie had subsequently lost their patent suits against
Zeneca, and were therefore precluded from marketing tamoxifen
until the Zeneca patent expired. 1 The tamoxifen patent expired on
August 20, 2002, and generic DMs soon began marketing their own
versions of tamoxifen.132
Consumers and consumer groups soon filed a consolidated class
action challenging the legality of the Tamoxifen Agreement. 133 The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Tamoxifen Agreement
facilitated Zeneca's continued monopolization of the tamoxifen
market and prevented competition from other generic DMs of
tamoxfen.-14  Defendants moved to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6),
127. Id.; See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma GMBH & Co., 991 F.2d
811, 1993 WL 118931, at *1 U.S. App. LEXIS 14872, at *1-*2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 1993)
(unpublished opinion).
128. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 378 n.9.
129. See Zeneca Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., 111 F.3d 144 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10,
1997)(unpublished opinion); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 2000 WL 34335805, at
*15, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22631, at *51-*53 (D. Mass. Sept.11, 2000); AstraZenecaUK
Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 00-2239, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 30, 2000).
130. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 379-380.
131. Id. at 380.
132. Id.
133. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 196 F.Supp.2d 1371 (2001) (order of the
judicial panel on multi-district litigation transferring the consolidated cases to the Eastern
District of New York).
134. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F.Supp.2d 121,127-128 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
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and the district court granted that motion.1  The district court stated
that market-division agreements between a monopolist and a
potential competitor would normally violate the Sherman Act, but
there is an exception for a patent-holding monopolist.'36 The court
drew the line between lawful and unlawful conduct by noting that a
patent holder is prohibited from acting in bad faith "beyond the limits
of the patent monopoly" to restrain or monopolize trade. 37 The court
also distinguished the case from other cases, finding unlawful conduct
by stating that this case ended litigation definitively, and thus
removed any bar that would prevent others from bringing their own
ANDAs. 1 3' The court also found that Barr's assertion of its 180-day
exclusivity right was protected under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine,1 39 and that plaintiffs had suffered no antitrust injury, as the
only harm was due to the legal monopoly that a patent holder
140possesses.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, with a dissent by Judge Pooler1 41 Yet again, the majority
here found that the issue turned on the scope of the patent, noting
that "[i]f the plaintiffs alleged facts that, if proved, would establish
that the Settlement Agreement provided the defendants with benefits
exceeding the scope of the tamoxifen patent, they would succeed in
alleging an antitrust violation."'142 The court did not, however, define
the "scope of the ... patent.
' 143
135. Id. at 140.
136. Id. at 128-129.
137. Id. at 129.
138. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2005).
139. The Noerr- Pennington doctrine refers to a trio of Supreme Court cases in which
the court held that, absent an objectively baseless and bad faith "sham," petitioning the
government cannot be the basis for an antitrust violation. This includes lobbying, bringing
lawsuits, and petitions to all departments of the government. See Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
140. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 382.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 384.
143. Rather, they only noted that a patentee is "entitled to defend the patent's validity
in court, to sue alleged infringers, and to settle with them, whatever its private doubts,
unless a neutral observer would reasonably think either that the patent was almost certain
to be declared invalid, or the defendants were almost certain to be found not to have
infringed it, if the suit went to judgment." Id. at 394 (quoting Asahi Glass, Co., Ltd. v.
Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 992-993 (N.D. II. 2003)). Further, they found
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After discussing the tension between the patent and antitrust
laws and stressing the importance of encouraging settlement in all
litigation, the court cautioned that rules restricting patent settlements
might run against the grain of both the patent and antitrust laws by
delaying innovation.14 4 Next, the court engaged in an excellent review
of the redistribution of risk in litigation created by the Hatch-
Waxman Act, noting that "Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes
the relative risk assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds
and their magnitude."' 45 This discussion appears to have been the
basis for the court's decision to avoid "categorically condemning
reverse payments" in settlement. 146  Nonetheless, the court then
examined whether the payments here were excessive, and whether
excessive reverse payments should be banned in general, but rejected
both notions, again resting on the importance of allowing settlement
in patent litigation, in whatever form it may take.' Then, addressing
the Tamoxifen Agreement, the court found that "(1) the agreements
did not bar the introduction of any non-infringing products;1 4 1 (2) they
ended all litigation between Zeneca and Barr, thus opening the field
to other generic challengers; and (3) they did not foreclose
competition because they allowed Barr to market Zeneca's version of
Tamoxifen."' 49 Finally, the court found that any actual harm to
consumers was a result of the lawful monopoly power that inheres in
a patent, and not from antitrust violations. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority stressed the inability of courts to assess the
likely outcome on appeal of the patent litigation, as well as the
presumption of validity afforded to patents, finding the fact that the
settlement was reached after a district court finding of invalidity to be
"of little moment."'' Is
that "the Settlement Agreement did not unlawfully extend the reach of Zeneca's
tamoxifen patent." In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 397. Setting at least one certain
boundary, however, the court did find that "an agreement to time the deployment of the
exclusivity period to extend the patent's monopoly power might well constitute
anticompetitive action outside the scope of a valid patent." Id. at 401.
144. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 383-388.
145. Id. at 390-391 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th
Cir. 2005)) (citation omitted).
146. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 391.
147. Id.
148. Thus distinguishing the case from In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2003).
149. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 407 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 388.
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Judge Pooler, in a concise dissent, disagreed with the majority's
standard-that, to violate the Sherman Act, an agreement must exceed
the scope of the patent or arise from an objectively baseless "sham"
lawsuit-and found a number of other errors in the majority's
opinion."' He criticized the majority's reliance on the presumption of
validity of the patent and reluctance to assess the strength of the
patent, especially after an initial invalidity determination, and opined
that such an early ruling precluded needed discovery, finding the
majority's pleading standard too stringent.'15
It is important to note that the majority addressed a number of
the shortcomings of the Hatch-Waxman Act. First, they noted the
excessive redistribution of risk, in which an ANDA filer risks only the
costs of litigation, while the pioneer drug inventor risks losing its
entire monopoly on a valuable drug. Second, they agreed that the
reverse payment settlements were a likely outcome of that
redistribution of risk. Third, they even agreed that the incentives
created by Hatch-Waxman encourage the maintenance of a
monopoly on a pioneer drug, as the benefit of maintaining that
monopoly and sharing the profits often exceed the best possible
outcome of litigation for a generic challenger. I B
Despite extensive analysis, the majority in In re Tamoxifien relied
on the importance of settlement and the presumption that paying to
protect a patent monopoly is conduct within the scope of the patent,
in issuing their decision. The majority seemed simply to have
acquiesced to the fact that Hatch-Waxman encourages these type of
agreements, almost taking it as a signal of their immunity to antitrust
challenges. Moreover, the majority points to the fact that settlement
of the initial litigation opens the door for subsequent challenges by
other ANDA filers, thus essentially ignoring the FDA approval-
delaying, and thus monopoly-extending effects of the thirty-month
stay provision and the 180-day exclusionary marketing grant to the
first filer. And, once again, the court entirely failed to analyze
whether the scope of the patent exceeds the scope of the agreement,
but instead simply presumed that any non-sham settlement is covered
by the exclusionary zone of the patent.
151. Id. at 408.
152. Id.
153. See the court's hypothetical, which, although "vastly oversimplified," clearly
illustrates the propensity for pioneers and generics to share monopoly profits instead of
allowing generic entry. Id. at 393 n.24.
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6. Ciprofloxacin (Federal Circuit 2008)
Lastly, in the most recent decision in the reverse-payment line,
the Federal Circuit ruled with the majority of courts that the key
inquiry is whether the scope of the agreement exceeds the scope of
the patent. In this case, the court noted that any anticompetitive
effects were within the exclusionary zone of the patent, thus
essentially finding no "antitrust injury," as the only injury asserted
was simply due to the lawful exclusionary right that inheres in the
patent. Once again, however, the court failed to address the extent of
the scope of the patent.
Ciprofloxacin, or Cipro, is a widely prescribed anti-bacterial
drug. Bayer received a patent on the drug, and FDA approval to
market Cipro in 1987.' 4 In 1991, Barr filed an ANDA for a generic
version of Cipro, including a paragraph IV certification claiming that
the Cipro patent was invalid or unenforceable. 5 Bayer then sued
Barr for patent infringement in 1992, Barr counterclaiming for
declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid.'' Four years later,
the parties entered into settlement discussions which resulted in a
series of settlement agreements (the "Cipro Agreements").'17 These
agreements provided that Barr (and its co-defendants) would not
challenge the validity or enforceability of the Cipro patent, Barr
would convert its ANDA to a paragraph III certification, and Bayer
would pay Barr $49.1 million. In addition, Bayer agreed to either
supply Barr with Cipro for resale or make quarterly payments to Barr
until December 31, 2003 (22 days after expiration of the patent, but
five months before the FDAs additional six months of marketing
exclusivity would run) 85' Barr also agreed not to make or market any
generic version of Cipro in the United States.' 9 Bayer then filed for a
reexamination of its patent, cancelled and amended certain claims,
and reaffirmed its rights to the Cipro patent.'" Four other generic





158. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1329. In total, Bayer paid Barr $398.1 million. Id.
at 1329 n.5.
159. Id. Notice that this could be read to include non-infringing alternatives, though
the existence of such alternatives is unlikely given that the Cipro patent is directed to the
actual compound, not to a formulation or a dissolution profile as in some other cases.
160. Id.
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companies then filed paragraph IV ANDAs and Bayer prevailed in
the subsequent patent litigation.''
The antitrust plaintiffs then filed a consolidated complaint in the
Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Cipro Agreements
were an illegal market allocation in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 62 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment claiming that the agreements were illegal per se.
The court then denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion for summary
judgment regarding whether the agreements had anticompetitive
effects.' However, the court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, employing a rule of reason approach, finding that
the relevant market was Ciprofloxacin and that Bayer had market
power, but any adverse effects on competition were within the
exclusionary zone of the Cipro patent.'14 The absence of evidence
that the Cipro Agreements created a bottleneck on challenges to the
patent or otherwise restrained competition beyond the scope of the
patent was fatal to the plaintiffs' case."65 Notably, the court rejected
the notion that the exclusionary power of the patent should be
tempered by the patent's potential invalidity. 6
On appeal to the Federal Circuit ("FC"), the FC affirmed the
district court's decision on all counts.' The FC first determined that
the district court appropriately applied a rule of reason analysis,
finding that, under Second Circuit precedent, the district court
determined the relevant market, addressed the question of market
power, and then found that the agreements did not restrain
competition outside the exclusionary zone of the patent."' Next,
addressing appellants assertion that Bayer simply sought to "insulate
itself from competition and avoid the risk that the patent is held
invalid," '69 the court found that the district court did not err in
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1329-1330.
164. Id. at 1330.
165. Id. at 1330.
166. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1330. (once again rejecting In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F.Supp.2d 1279 (S.D.Fla. 2005)).
167. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1340-1341. Interestingly, jurisdiction was invoked
because of a Walker Process-type state antitrust claim added to the amended complaint
that was dismissed as preempted by federal patent law.
168. Id. at 1332.
169. Id. at 1333.
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rejecting that argument."() Rather, the court found, the Cipro
Agreements were within Bayer's rights as a patentee, as the "essence
of the Agreements were to exclude the defendants from profiting
from the patented invention."'' The court found that the "mere fact
that the Agreements insulated Bayer from patent validity challenges
by the generic defendants was not in itself an antitrust violation. ,1
72
Next, the court reaffirmed that the appropriate question in this
context is to determine "whether the agreements restricted
competition beyond the exclusionary effects of the patent,"'173 and
rejected the holding of In re Cardizem to the extent it held otherwise.
Moreover, the court found that, in the absence of fraud on the PTO
or sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the
patent in an antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a
reverse payment. '4 Finally, the FC addressed the Walker Process-
type state antitrust claim, affirmed the preemption ruling, and
dismissed any notion that the agreement extended the patent by
retaining Barr's 180-day exclusivity period. 7'
7. Current Majority Rules
The majority of courts, including the Federal, Second, and
Eleventh Circuits in Cipro, Tam oxifen, Valley Drug and Schering-
Plough, have held that the proper inquiry in reverse payment
settlements is to compare the scope of the patent to the scope of the
settlement agreement. In the absence of fraud on the PTO or "sham"
litigation, these courts have held that reverse payment settlements are
not per se illegal if the scope and exclusionary effects of the
settlement fall within the scope of the patent. The majority has
rejected the argument that "paying for delay" is per se illegal, or that
paying to protect a patent from challenges is outside the scope of the
patent's protection. In short, these holdings have given great weight
to the general policy encouraging settlement of patent litigation,
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1334.
173. Id. at 1335. (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir.
2005)).
174. Id. at 1335. (confirming rejection of the approach taken in In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F.Supp.2d 1279 (S.D.Fla. 2005)).
175. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1339
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warning that restricting the right to settle will disincentivize patent
litigation and may even undermine the incentive to patent."'
In perhaps their greatest shortcoming, the majority has shied
away from in-depth analysis of the true scope of the patent, rejecting
any notion that the patent's scope depends on its actual validity.
Instead, the majority has relied almost exclusively on the presumption
of patent validity to justify upholding any settlement of patent
litigation. In distinguishing the contrary holding in In re Cardizem,
the courts almost universally point to the fact that the settlement in
that case explicitly prevented Andrx from marketing non-infringing
generic drugs, while failing to note that the reverse payments in their
cases certainly discouraged development of non-infringing
alternatives, and perhaps even included an unwritten understanding
that the generic DMs would not market alternatives. Oddly enough,
Andrx, the generic DM in In Re Cardizem, actually ended the
agreement by reformulating its generic drug into a non-infringing
form and obtaining FDA approval to market it. It seems hard to
distinguish the case on the basis that the agreement foreclosed non-
infringing generic entry, when in fact non-infringing generic entry was
what brought the agreement to a close.
Thus, the current "majority" rule amongst the circuits essentially
allows any reverse payment settlement, so long as it is expressly
limited to the patented drug and does not involve fraud on the PTO
or "sham" litigation.
8. Current Minority Rule
The minority rule is, unfortunately, not much better than the
majority rule. While the Cardizem court rightly found a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, the case does deserve to be
distinguished from the others. Cardizem failed to focus on the correct
inquiry, comparing patent scope to the exclusionary effect of the
settlement.
In stark contrast is the In re Terazosin case, the Valley Drug case
on remand to the district court. The district court there was the only
court brave enough to undertake an extensive analysis of the true
scope of the patent. The court then compared the scope of the
patent to the scope of the settlement, and determined the correct
outcome. As suggested by Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, reverse
payment settlements would be per se illegal absent the existence of a
176. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 383-388 (2d Cir. 2005).
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patent, a fact also expressly recognized by almost every court. Thus,
a true rule of reason analysis is not proper.' Rather, these otherwise
per se agreements should be analyzed first to determine whether they
exceed the exclusionary power of the patent, and then under a more
succinct per se analysis if any part of the settlement exceeds the
exclusionary power of the patent.
17
N
Thus, while even the district court in Cardizem used the wrong
approach (though it probably reached the right outcome), the
combination of the majority's inquiry, with the minority's emphasis
on the legality of the agreement outside the patent litigation context,
should result in the correct analysis. This analysis was undertaken by
the district court in Terazosin, and though it may not have been
perfect, as the majority may be correct in discouraging a full inquiry
into the likely outcome of the patent litigation, it was on the right
track. 1' The true problem, however, lies not only in the judicial
analysis of the problem, but in the nature of the Hatch-Waxman Act
itself. A comprehensive solution is needed.
Il. The Root of the Problem
As stated above, the problem at the root of these reverse
payment settlements is multi-faceted, and requires understanding of
the effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a proper analysis of the
antitrust and patent questions in court, and ardent enforcement by
the FTC/DOJ and private litigants. This section will first explore how
the regulations in place create a re-allocation of risks and incentives
in making both pioneer and generic drugs. By using hypothetical
examples, this section will also show how the new risks and incentives
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act have created the current problem
of reverse-payment settlements. Next, this section will address the
pressing question of the true scope of the patent. If indeed the
majority of courts are correct in their interpretation that reverse-
payment settlements in the pharmaceutical context violate antitrust
law only if the agreements exceed the scope of the patent, then we
must understand the true scope of the patent. The key inquiry here,
in this author's opinion, is whether paying a challenger to drop a
patent lawsuit, at least in the Hatch-Waxman context, is within the
177. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1730.
178. Id.
179. It should be noted that Judge Pooler's dissent in the Tamoxifen case called for the
same analysis. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 407 (Pooler, Judge, Dissenting).
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normal scope of the patent itself, or is a means of protecting a weak
patent from challenge. If such a payment is in fact outside the scope
of the patent, then reverse-payment settlements of the type illustrated
in the above case law are not protected by patent law, and are subject
to antitrust liability.
A. A Perverse Inversion of Incentive
The regulatory root of the problem lies in the perverse re-
distribution of incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. The
statute encourages the division of markets by settling patent
litigation, and maintenance of a patent monopoly creates a pot bigger
than the expected combined profits of market entrants if the patent is
invalidated.' °  It thus incentivizes the parties to settle, and gives
generic DMs the upper hand in negotiating a settlement.'' As
illustrated by the hypothetical below (reflected in a similar
hypothetical in Tamoxifen),18 2 Hatch-Waxman redistributes litigation
risk and allows nearly cost-less generic market entrance upon patent
invalidation, thereby creating a perverse system that encourages the
continuance of monopoly pricing on patented drugs through the end
of the patent's life. This benefit creates a windfall for generics,
protects bad patents, and in the end, harms only one party: the
consumer. The result is that the system in place, which was created to




As stated by the Second Circuit in Tam oxifen, Hatch-Waxman
reallocates the risk inherent in patent litigation."' Hatch-Waxman
immunizes the preparation of an ANDA from infringement liability
and makes the filing of an ANDA an act of infringement."6 Hatch-
Waxman thus allows an ANDA filer to incite patent infringement
litigation without putting itself at risk of incurring damages. The
180. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 393 n.24.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 15.
185. See generally In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 390-391.
186. See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000), 35
U.S.C. § 156 (2000), and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000)).
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pioneer DM, by contrast, risks losing its monopoly on the drug
market by filing an infringement action because, in doing so, it will
expose its patent to potential invalidation. Thus, while both parties
will incur substantial litigation costs, the ANDA filer has little else to
lose,8 but the pioneer DM could lose billions of dollars in revenue
upon an unfavorable outcome."' s This is a complete inversion of the
incentives in a normal infringement action, where the infringer has a
substantial risk of loss (in the form of damages for infringement and
an injunction on the infringing activity), and the patentee stands to
gain more and lose less (by eliminating a competitor and earning
infringement damages). Therefore, Hatch-Waxman reverses the
normal risk calculus involved in pharmaceutical patent litigation
because it allows the generic DM to force patent litigation without
incurring the risk of loss.
To add to the inversion of risk, the pioneer DM stands to lose
much more by invalidation of a patent than a generic DM stands to
gain. The development of pioneer drugs is a high-risk, high-reward
undertaking. Pioneer DMs routinely spend hundreds of millions or
even billions of dollars developing a new drug, isolating it, developing
into an administerable form, ushering it through multiple rounds of
FDA trials, and finally bringing it to market. In return, these pioneer
DMs are usually rewarded with the exclusive right to market the drug
by a combination of patent protection and exclusive FDA approval.
Because of the high-risk and the massive sunk costs, as well as the
surprising failure rate of such drugs at some point between invention
and FDA approval, the pioneer DMs need to recoup their investment
and earn a substantial profit from the drugs that do reach the market
in order to adequately incentivize the development of new drugs.
Without the promise of a monopoly and the accompanying profits,
pioneer DMs and their stockholders would be loathe to invest the
time and money required to bring these drugs to market.
Generic DMs, on the other hand are in a comparatively low-risk,
low-reward industry. In essence, the generic DMs are able to
piggyback on the work of the pioneer DMs, thus avoiding the massive
sunk costs and years of development required of a pioneer. In order
187. See Requirements for Submission of In Vivo Bioequivalence Data, 68 Fed. Reg.
61640, 61645 (Proposed Oct. 29, 2003) (estimating that preparing and filing an ANDA can
cost between $300,000 and $1 million).
188. For example, note that in the Tamoxifen case, Barr captured 80-percent of the
market for tamoxifen in a short period of time, with only a 15-percent wholesale discount.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text; In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 378 n.9.
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to bring a drug to market, a generic need only file an ANDA, set up
manufacturing facilities, and begin marketing and selling the drug.
The average cost differential between the generic road to market and
that of the pioneer is probably in the area of two orders of
magnitude." 9 However, if generic entry is allowed, it is not limited to
a single producer, but rather to any generic capable and interested.
Thus, generic DMs generally enter a competitive market and must
sell their product at a much lower cost, reflecting the much lower cost
they incur to bring a drug to market.
The competitive level of the market is greatly reduced by the fact
that Hatch-Waxman allows six months of market exclusivity to the
first generic to file a paragraph IV ANDA. 9" The six-month head
start actually allows the first generic producer to capture a substantial
portion of the market without lowering prices all the way to a
competitive level.'9' This may be the result of the structure of the
pharmaceutical distribution industry, because the first discount
producer of a drug is able to develop distribution channels and can
lock in long-term contracts with many purchasers, thus preventing
subsequent generics from gaining an appreciable market share.
The result is that, in litigation, the pioneer DM stands to lose a
massive source of income, as its monopoly market share and
monopoly pricing will give way to a competitive market in which it is
unlikely to maintain much market share, even if it drops prices. The
generic DM, on the other hand, has little to lose, but could potentially
gain a large market share, while not entirely dropping prices to
competitive levels. Pioneers often stand to lose billions, while generic
producers usually stand to make tens or hundeds of millions. It is no
surprise then that, while normal infringement settlements commonly
result in payments from the accused infringer to the patentee, often
paired with a license, Hatch-Waxman settlements more commonly
involve a reverse payment. As one commentator noted, even a
patentee with a 75-percent chance of winning at trial might wish to
curtail that risk by sharing 25-percent of its monopoly profits with an
189. Assuming a cost of around $5 million to $10 million for a generic and $500 million
to $1 billion for a pioneer.
190. See supra note 186. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; In re Tamoxifen,
429 F.3d at 378 n.9.
191. See supra note 186.
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ANDA filer, rather than risk the devastating loss of a patent
monopoly.'19
2. A New Best Outcome
As illustrated by the hypothetical in In re Tamoxifen, a generic
first challenger can often make more money from a reverse-payment
settlement than it can from invalidating a patent and gaining generic
entry, even with the 180-day market exclusivity included.'93 Thus, by
preserving monopoly profits, both the challenging generic and the
patentee can exceed the profit they would make in a competitive
market.194 For clarity, I offer a hypothetical below:
Suppose Pioneer Drugs, Inc. ("Pioneer") creates a new drug to
relieve headaches which it plans to market as "Relief." Pioneer
obtains a patent and FDA approval to market Relief, and quickly
begins to make a handsome profit.
Immediately thereafter, Generic Pharmaceuticals ("Generic")
applies to make and sell a generic version of Relief, filing an ANDA
with a paragraph IV certification claiming that the Relief patent is
invalid as an obvious improvement on aspirin. As the first filer,
Generic will be entitled to a 180-day marketing exclusivity period
beginning from the first date of marketing or a district court ruling in
its favor. Pioneer sues for patent infringement within forty-five days,
thus triggering the thirty-month stay of FDA approval for Generic's
drug.
After motions for summary judgment and extensive discovery
over a period of two-and-one-half years, Generic and Pioneer prepare
themselves for trial. On the eve of trial, however, Generic and
Pioneer meet to discuss a potential settlement. After reviewing the
merits of the case, it is apparent to both parties that Generic will
probably win at trial, as the Relief patent is clearly obvious. They
then review the current market conditions.
192. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1758-1759. See also Cotter, supra note 11,
at 1812 (suggesting that this type of reverse payment settlement should be allowed); cf
Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Anttirust." On "Probabilistic"
Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST 68, 72 (2003) (suggesting that although
one may want to alleviate a 10-percent uncertainty by settlement, "[i]n our legal system, a
10 percent chance of rain is not rain.").
193. In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 393 n.24.
194. For an amusing analogy, see McDonald, supra note 192, at 68 (describing the
economic analysis by Butch Cassidy, played by Paul Newman, of E.H. Harriman paying a
large amount of money to hunt him down, he said: "That's bad business .... If he'd just
pay me what he's spending to make me stop robbing him, I'd stop robbing him.").
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At this time, after being on the market for more than two years,
Relief is one of the most widely prescribed medications for people
with chronic and migraine headaches. In its first year, Pioneer sold 50
million pills for a total profit of $500 million. In the second year,
Pioneer sold 100 million pills for a total profit of $1 billion. Pioneer
expects to maintain those profits for the next ten years for a total of
$10 billion over that span.
Generic, meanwhile, has estimated that it can afford to sell the
pills at 75-percent of Pioneer's price for the 180 days in which it can
market exclusively, thus obtaining an 80-percent market share. After
that, when other DMs enter the market, Generic will have to sell pills
at between 20-percent and 50-percent of the current Relief price, with
an expected market share of 60-percent at most. Thus, Generic
expects to profit up to 75-percent (profit per pill) of 80-percent
(market share) of $500 million (Pioneer's would-be profit) for the
first half-year, totaling $300 million. For the rest of the year, at best,
Generic hopes to make 50-percent of 60-percent of $500 million, for a
total of $150 million. After that, it will make $300 million per year at
most, and possibly significantly less. Meanwhile, with a best-case
scenario of maintaining a 10-percent to 20-percent% market share at
the current Relief price, Pioneer expects to make significantly less
than $200 million per year, at most, if Generic wins its suit.
After reviewing their potential profits under a competitive
market, Pioneer makes a suggestion: why not split the current $1
billion per year profit instead of settling for $300 million and $200
million in a best case scenario. If Pioneer pays Generic $500 million
per year to stay out of the market for Relief, Pioneer, and Generic
will both end up with significantly more than their expected profit
under a competitive market. And to ensure that neither party is
disadvantaged in a competitive market, the agreement can include a
dissolution provision in the case of subsequent invalidation of the
Relief patent. However, because the Hatch-Waxman regime
discourages subsequent ANDA filers from filing until the first
litigation has been resolved (because they don't get the 180-day
exclusivity period, and why pay for litigation when someone else is
already doing the dirty work?), no other company has yet filed an
ANDA. If one does, litigation will trigger the thirty-month stay, thus
ensuring extension of the Relief monopoly for nearly three years.
Additionally, Generic will have the ability to assert its 180-day
exclusivity, thus further extending the monopoly another six months.
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Under this system, the incentive to protect one's monopoly by
"paying for delay" is matched by the generic's incentive to maximize
its profits by avoiding invalidation of the pioneer patent, and splitting
the monopoly profits instead.
Further, to add to the already diminished incentive to file an
ANDA, subsequent filers will be disadvantaged because (a) Pioneer
will have already litigated its patent and will probably know its best
defenses and biggest weaknesses; (b) the litigation is likely to be
dragged out for more than thirty months, and even an invalidity
determination at the district court level (which triggers the beginning
of the 180-day period and allows for FDA approval of the generic)
will retain the threat of infringement damages if the case is
overturned on appeal; and (c) even if the subsequent ANDA filer
wins, two companies will already be ahead of it as far as production
and distribution channels, and could simply lower their prices,
preventing the subsequent ANDA filer from garnering a substantial
market share. 9"
The question is how an agreement in this context is different
from a naked horizontal restraint. Even if the agreement allows for
subsequent litigation, as emphasized in In re Tamoxifen, it
nonetheless forestalls generic entry for at least thirty months. And
even if the agreement is a valid settlement of patent litigation,
perhaps necessitated by a regulatory regime that encourages such
settlements, is that "substantial pro-competitive justification" not
rebutted by the existence of an "alternative means that is less
restrictive of competition," such as allowing earlier generic entry?'
It is clear that such a market division agreement would not be
allowed absent an immunity from the antitrust laws, such as that
granted by the "legal monopoly" that inheres in a patent. 197 But is
"paying to protect" a patent within the scope of that patent? As the
Cardizem court found, the answer should be no.198 The exclusionary
power of a patent is a power vindicated through the courts, and
195. See generally Avery, supra note 15 (discussing the additional problem of
authorized generics and their discouraging effect on subsequent ANDA filers). But cf
Hemphill, supra note 11 (noting that authorized generics can be a pro-competitive form of
settlement in lieu of reverse payments, much like delayed entry).
196. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1762-1763.
197. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir.
2003).
198. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
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paying to protect a patent is an extra-legal remedy outside the scope
of that patent.
B. Extra-Legal Protection and the True Scope of the Patent
The question squarely addressed by the Cardizem and Terazosin
courts, yet largely ignored by the majority of appellate courts is how
to define the true scope of the patent. As Carl Shapiro noted, the
true grant of power from the patent is not the right to exclude, but the
right to try to exclude.'99 And the presumption of validity, although
heavily relied on the by majority of courts in this context, is expressly
a "rebuttable" presumption. .... The question that then arises is
whether the true scope of the patent and its exclusionary effects
actually encompass the right to pay others not to infringe one's
patent, or not to challenge it. The Cardizem court found the question
quite easy to answer, noting that it is one thing to take advantage of a
monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing
altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting
competition by paying the only potential competitor $40 million per
year to stay our of the market."'' "' Yet, the Tamoxifen court
essentially held exactly the opposite, in noting that "[w]e do not think
that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent
monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation," and
"we think that Zeneca was then entitled to protect its tamoxifen patent
monopoly through settlement."22  An analogy to real property law
sheds some light on the minority argument:
The power to exclude afforded by a patent can be analogized to
the power to exclude afforded by fee simple absolute in a piece of
real property. As an owner of a patent, one has the absolute right to
exclude others from practicing the subject of the patent. Similarly, as
the owner of real property, one has the absolute right to exclude
others from trespassing on that property. In both cases, one can
remedy a violation of that right to exclude by bringing a lawsuit-an
action for trespass or an action for infringement. Alternatively, one
could forebear the right to sue by contracting not to sue, in exchange
199. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395
(2003).
200. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
201. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
202. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 389, 392 n.22 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added).
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for some form of compensation. Generally, such a contract is known
as a license in the patent context, and an easement in the real
property context. Bringing, threatening, and settling lawsuits, as well
as contracting for the forebearance of those rights are considered to
be valid exercises of the patent and property rights, and are thus
naturally within the scope of those rights.
When one pays to protect one's rights in property, either physical
or intellectual, however, it is an extra-legal payment. That is, such a
payment is beyond the bounds of the legal right. Paying someone not
to sue for declaratory judgment of invalidity of a patent (or to drop
their invalidity or non-infringement claims in an infringement suit
against them) is like paying someone not to trespass on one's
property. Rather than an exercise of the right to exclude others from
the property, the payment is more like paying for "protection" in the
racketeering context. As an example, compare the following two
hypotheticals:
1. The Bar
John Adams owns a bar. Tony Soprano and twenty friends show
up to the bar every day for a week, occupying every seat, ordering
only water, and paying no tips. After repeatedly asking them to
leave, John finally threatens to sue Tony and his friends for
trespassing and to have the police remove them from the property.
Tony says that he and his friends will show up the next day anyway.
John sues for damages and Tony countersues to quiet title to the
property, alleging that his friend Larry has the real deed to the bar.
Larry, however, is a devout Christian who has been looking for a new
place to build a church, and he is unaware of his claim to the building.
After talking it out, and discussing the fact that neither John nor
Tony wants another church in town, and both would profit much
more if John were able to maintain his ownership of the property,
John Adams agrees to pay Tony $500 a week if Tony will agree to
drop the suit and not show up to the bar every day.
2. The Fork Patent
John Adams owns a patent on a new type of fork. He makes and
sells the forks for $15 each. Tony Soprano decides that he also wants
to make these forks. He begins to make the forks and sells them for
$5 each. John Adams sues for patent infringement and Tony alleges
invalidity of the patent. Tony and John discuss the case, and
determine that if the patent is declared invalid, a fork-making
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conglomerate, Forks & Knives, Inc., will sell the same forks for $0.50
each on a national scale, though they won't be able to begin selling
for 6 months. John and Tony decide to settle their case, with John
agreeing to pay Tony $1,000 a week to stay out of the fork market,
and to drop his invalidity claims.
3. Analysis
In both hypotheticals, the patentee/property owner is paying to
protect his property rights. In each case the patentee/property owner
has a legal means of recourse through which he can enforce his
property rights. But in both cases, the owner elects to pay to protect
his property right, perhaps out of fear that the property right is
vulnerable to attack. Moreover, in both cases a final adjudication in
favor of the challenger will result in a less favorable outcome than
settlement. Yet these settlements are merely contracts to avoid
competition or adverse action by other parties. They are extra-legal
remedies, in that they are made instead of enforcing legal rights,
rather than as a part of the enforcement of those rights. The legal
remedy is the right to invoke the power of the courts and the legal
system to exclude others from one's property. A settlement
encompassed within that legal remedy would be recognition that the
legal remedy will likely succeed. In order to avoid the absolute
nature of the legal remedy, the parties might choose to settle,
including a compromise involving a payment from the defendant to
the plaintiff. Alternatively, if the defendant is sure to win, he can
either pursue his legal remedy to the end or obtain an agreement that
the property owner will not enforce his legal rights as against the
defendant, i.e., a favorable license agreement or a cheap easement. A
situation in which the property owner pays the defendant to agree to
drop the lawsuit is almost always indicative of an anticompetitive
intent, as the parties will only do so if the legal remedy sought by the
plaintiff is unlikely to be obtained and both parties will be better off
sharing in the fruits of the pre-litigation environment.
IV. Proposed Solutions
If indeed competitive markets are favored, the Hatch-Waxman
Act works in opposition to the favored outcome, at least in its
propensity to allow collusive agreements. Some previous proposals to
remedy this propensity have merit, but few if any address the entire
scope of the problem. This section will first review some proposed
solutions to the problem, from the FTC, scholars, and even courts.
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After a brief analysis of these proposals, this section will propose a
new and comprehensive solution that can be enacted only through a
combination of change in regulation and the courts.
A. Previous Proposals
Previous proposals to fix the problem posed by these reverse-
payment settlements have been posited by scholars, courts, and
administrative agencies alike. The FTC proposed a rule that would
limit reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman settlements to reasonable
litigation costs, capped at $2 million.23 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark
Janis, and Mark Lemley proposed a presumption of illegality in such
settlements, to be rebutted by the defendant.2 4  Though these
proposals have some merit, the problem is that these would-be
solutions only address one facet of the problem. Additionally, these
solutions would probably have the effect of pushing the parties
towards secrecy and concealment of the true scope of their
agreement. Rather than clear and open reverse payment settlements
(though most are "confidential"), we would have settlements with
sham licensing, secret side agreements, or agreements that otherwise
evade detection and make enforcing the antitrust laws even more
difficult. That likely outcome is, of course, inflated by the fact that all
such agreements must now be submitted to the FTC, and parties
would be loathe to include such a provision in a written agreement, if
such stringent restrictions were imposed. Nor would such restrictions
be entirely effective, as they ignore the underlying perverse incentives
created by the Hatch-Waxman Act.2'5 Such rules might, in fact, force
excessive patent litigation costs upon pioneer drug inventors, and
could even disincentivize generic DMs from entering the market at
all. A similar proposition-that reverse payment settlements be
limited to the amount a generic DM could earn in a competitive
market-would work no benefit to consumers, would still allow for
collusive settlements, and would only have the effect of maintaining
profits in the hands of the pioneer inventor, rather than a would-be
generic DM.
2°6
203. See supra, notes 110 and 111 and accompanying text.
204. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 11, at 1759-1760.
205. See supra Section III.A. (discussing the reallocation of risk in ANDA paragraph 4
filings and the litigation that arises therefrom).
206. See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 395.
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De facto proposals by courts have come closer to the right
answer, but there is still no consensus. The district court in In re
Terazosin (the Valley Drug case on remand) suggested that the court
review the strength of the patent's exclusionary power by reviewing
the likely outcome in the underlying patent litigation at the time of
the settlement, and then comparing that to the scope of the
agreement.2  The majority of appellate courts have held that the
proper analysis involves comparing the scope of the patent's
exclusionary right to the effects of the settlement, in order to
determine whether the latter falls within the former. 2°( The minority
case, In re Cardizem, suggested that such agreements are per se
illegal, as they are not within the scope of the patent, but are being
used to protect the patent from attack.2 °9
Clearly, most of the courts have focused on, and have probably
deduced the proper question, seeking to balance the countervailing
interests of patent and antitrust law-does the scope of the agreement
exceed the scope of the patent's exclusionary power? Yet, in
answering that question, the courts have taken approaches ranging
from a scrutinizing appraisal of the likely outcome of the underlying
patent litigation,2 to a broad assumption that anything involving a
settlement and only affecting a patented product (i.e., not restricting
sales of non-patented products) falls under that scope, unless sham or
fraud is involved.211 Yet even when the courts have addressed the
perverse incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act, they have
generally reached only so far as acknowledging that the incentive
exists, and in turn use it as a justification for upholding the legality of
reverse payment settlements.2 2
To solve the problem, a two-step approach must be taken. First,
the Hatch-Waxman regime should be amended to dilute the parties'
ability to pay to maintain a patent monopoly, and to eliminate the
incentive to do so. Second, courts in the future must squarely address
what the true scope of the patent is, and whether that reaches to
payments to protect the patent from attack. The section below
addresses the implications of these potential solutions.
207. See supra notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
208. See generally, supra Section II.B.
209. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
210. See supra notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
211. See generally, supra Section II.B.1(7).
212. Id.
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B. A New Proposal
1. Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act
The perverse regime created by the Hatch-Waxman amendments
was probably unintentional. Indeed, the amendments were created
with the purpose of encouraging early generic entry, thus lowering
drug costs for consumers. 1  Yet, at least in the context of reverse
payment settlements, the statutory regime has had the opposite effect.
Hatch-Waxman in fact creates a system whereby the monopolist can
settle litigation and, because of the thirty-month stay provision and
the 180-day market exclusivity afforded to the first ANDA paragraph
IV filer, can effectively forestall actual generic entry without
prevailing on any patent claims. To do this, the pioneer drug
company need only settle with the first ANDA paragraph IV filer,
and agree to pay that party to refrain from marketing a generic drug.
Not only does such an agreement prevent that competitor from
entering the market, but it prevents others from entering the market
subsequently. Even if another ANDA filer is successful in
invalidating or infringing a patent, the 180-day exclusivity can afford
the scheming monopolist and the first-filer an additional half-year of
monopoly profits. And, largely ignored by the courts, the additional
thirty-month stays in litigation against subsequent ANDA filers grant
even the most undeserving monopolist an additional thirty months of
exclusivity on top of the first thirty-month stay. The fact that
subsequent ANDA paragraph IV filers could file just after the first
filer is irrelevant, as few parties are willing to risk and pay for
litigation when the first filer already has the 180-day exclusivity right,
and will already be embroiled in heated litigation. Undertaking an
expensive patent lawsuit when someone else is already footing the
costs and presumably able to exclude you for 180 days after the final
resolution of that suit, would seem a fool's errand.
a. Divorcing the FDA Approval Process from Patent Law
To rectify the myriad problems that inhere in the Hatch-Waxman
regulatory scheme, an important step to be taken is to divorce FDA
approval from patent law. As is evident in the reverse settlement
cases and the accompanying public outcry,214 the complex intertwining
213. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 9, 36, 63-65
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of patent law and FDA approval is not only unnecessary, but harmful
to competition and to the consumer.
A regime in which patent law and FDA approval were divorced
would incentivize generic entrance, as they could file and gain
approval for an ANDA immediately after an NDA was approved.
However, the ANDA approval would be meaningless where patent
litigation could act as the Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads
of the would-be generic market entrants. Importantly, though, only
the threat of patent litigation and the cost of infringement would
prevent market entrance, and the patent monopoly could not be
maintained through collusive price-fixing agreements and market
divisions, protected under the guise of the necessary regulatory
approval. Pioneers would, of course, object, as discussed in Section
(c) below.
b. Non-Patent Based Exclusivity
Alternatively, recognition by the FDA of the difficulty of
obtaining approval, could be just as effective, without raising the
specter of anti-competitive settlements that protect bad patents. This
recognition could take the form of exclusive approval to market the
drug for ten years, or a period of time determined by economists on a
congressional fact-finding committee, perhaps accompanied by a
similar 180 day exclusivity period for the first ANDA filer, and maybe
even secondary semi-exclusivity periods granted to subsequent filers.
The cost of obtaining FDA approval for a new drug, often in the
hundreds of millions of dollars when taking all expenses into
consideration, deserves patent-like protection even if the drug is not
protected under intellectual property laws.
c. Eliminating the Thirty-Month Stay
A further means of divorcing patent law from FDA approval would
be to eliminate the thirty-month stay triggered at the outset of patent
litigation. Pioneer DMs might argue that the thirty-month stay is the only
way to keep generic DMs out of the market, and that without it, cheap
competition would lower drug prices and prevent pioneers from reaping
their monopoly profit. This would greatly reduce the incentive of pioneers
to develop their drugs in the first place, because without a guarantee that
one will be free from competition, the expected value of a drug will not
warrant great expense at the research and development stage. This is a
legitimate concern, but the power of the patent and the potential for non-
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patent FDA exclusivity should alleviate such concerns in legitimate patent
disputes.
A valid patent would allow the pioneer to reap his monopoly
profits either by sufficiently deterring competition or by leading to
massive damages or extremely beneficial settlements in patent
litigation. And if the FDA recognized the value inherent in bringing
a drug to market, regardless of patent rights, FDA exclusivity could
provide valuable protection even for products with weak or no patent
protection. On the other hand, where patents are so weak that they
are almost assured of being defeated in litigation, generics will take a
calculated risk and will likely settle the litigation favorably with a
cheap license, or win quickly, thereby opening the market to cheap
generic drugs and thus benefiting both competition and consumers.
3. Redefining the Scope of the Patent in the Courts
In addition to changing the Hatch-Waxman regime, courts must
address the question of patent scope head-on. This is one reason why
it may be proper to grant the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction
over reverse-payment patent settlements, because the scope of the
patent must be determined, an area of law arguably within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. However, to ignore the
difference between "paying for delay" or paying to protect the patent
monopoly, and coming to a legitimate settlement ignores the reality
of the patent scope. Therefore, whether a full analysis of the
likelihood of success in the underlying litigation is warranted or not,
the question of patent scope is a necessary predicate to the outcome
of this type of litigation. Nor is such a drawn-out analysis of the
underlying strength or validity of the patent too difficult for courts to
undertake. Indeed, as illustrated by the district court in In re
Terazosin, such an analysis is not only possible, but can provide a
deeper insight into the true facts of the case, and can thus lead to the
correct conclusion.2'
V. Conclusion
Reverse payment settlements in pharmaceutical patent litigation
under the Hatch-Waxman Act extend pharmaceutical patent
monopolies and maintain monopoly prices on needed drugs. This
harms consumers and the general public, while allowing pioneer DMs
215. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F.Supp.2d 1279 (S.D.Fla.
2005).
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and generics to split the monopoly profits at the public expense. Yet
these settlements are allowed, and even encouraged, by the current
regulatory regime and the majority of circuit court rulings.
A solution to these problems is needed, but can only be achieved
through a comprehensive approach. By amending the Hatch-
Waxman Act, correctly defining the scope of the patent, and
encouraging zealous enforcement of the antitrust laws by both the
FTC/DOJ and private litigants, the problem can be solved. A
satisfactory result would be an increase in litigation seen through to
the end, settlements allowing earlier generic entry in lieu of reverse
payments, and lower drug prices for consumers.
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